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14.1  Introduction 
The theory  of  international economic policy  has taken  on a new 
dimension in the last few years with the application of game theory to 
the analysis of standard problems of international coordination of mon- 
etary and fiscal policies. Research in  this field has evolved from the 
assumption of  rather simple types of  strategic interaction in a static 
framework to more sophisticated applications of dynamic game theory. 
The authors who follow this approach in analyzing problems of  in- 
ternational economic coordination have always assumed-at  least to 
our knowledge-that  the policy authorities either cooperate completely 
in the process of optimizing their objective functions or do not coop- 
erate at all. In the real world, however, countries cooperate in some 
fields or for certain purposes while they go their own ways in  other 
fields or for other purposes. A recent and striking example of this was 
the new wave of cooperation that was expected to emerge and did, at 
least initially, in international monetary affairs after the meeting of the 
Group of Five in September 1985. While this movement toward mon- 
Giorgio Basevi is professor of international economics at the University of Bologna, 
visiting professor at the Bologna Center of Johns Hopkins University, and a member of 
the Council of  the European Economic Association. Paolo Kind, assistant professor of 
economics at the University of Chicago, was on leave as a professor at the Universities 
of  Bologna (1986 and 1987) and Padua (1987). Giorgio Poli, formerly a research assistant 
at the University of  Bologna, is on the research staff of Prometeia, an association for 
econometric studies based in Bologna. 
This paper is a product of ongoing research financed by the Italian National Research 
Council (C.N.R.) within a project entitled “Struttura ed evoluzione dell’economia ital- 
iana.”  M. Canzoneri, F. Giavazzi, A. Giovannini, H. Grossman, and D. Henderson have 
contributed essential ideas and useful comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
369 370  Giorgio BasevilPaolo Kind/Giorgio Poli 
etary cooperation was taking place, countries continued to wage war 
in the area of trade. 
Countries involved in international cooperation do not appear to have 
consistent views on who should reflate demand, and how it should be 
done, in order to eliminate trade imbalances and avoid an international 
recession. This confrontation in the real field, if allowed to continue, 
might  halt  the process of  international cooperation in the monetary 
field. Actually, there are signs that this may already be the case. 
More intriguing, yet alarming, is the related possibility that monetary 
cooperation that is not accompanied by cooperation in other fields may 
strengthen the forces that push for confrontation in the real field. In 
other words, uncooperative solutions may be superior to partially co- 
operative ones. 
Clearly, economic analysis of these possibilities requires the aban- 
donment  of  a  dichotomous  approach  to the theory  of  international 
economic policy-that  is, complete cooperation versus no cooperation 
at all-in  favor of  the identification of  different  levels  of  economic 
objectives and the possibility of the coexistence of cooperation at one 
level with conflict at another. 
In section 14.2, we present a model built around this idea that ac- 
counts for the coexistence of cooperation and confrontation between 
groups of countries. We  deal mainly with two groups of countries: the 
“U.S.” on one side, and the “EC” on the other. The EC is assumed 
to consist of two ideal countries, “Germany”  and “Italy.”  They gen- 
erally cooperate between themselves at all levels, except when mon- 
etary cooperation takes place only between Germany and the U.S. In 
contrast, even when all three countries cooperate at the monetary level, 
the U.S. and the EC are assumed to be in conflict at the real level. 
In  section  14.3, we  identify  a number  of  strategies and  resulting 
games that the two blocs and the three countries may play in response 
to an exogenous shock, represented by  a negative supply shift in all 
countries. We  then compute the resulting effects on the endogenous 
variables and on the loss functions of  the three countries. We  identify 
gains and losses that result both from the coexistence of  cooperation 
and confrontation and from the different trade and monetary arrange- 
ments that constrain the various solutions. 
The trade constraints that we concentrate on are caused by the use 
of the most-favored-nation principle, under which a tariff levied by a 
country on its imports does not discriminate between exporting coun- 
tries. However, an exception to this principle is introduced in some of 
the games, with the European countries applying a zero tariff to their 
reciprocal trade. In these games, the two European countries are con- 
strained to use a joint tariff vis-a-vis the United States. In other words, 
they form a customs union like the EC, not just a free trade area. 371  Economic Cooperation and Confrontation  between the U.S. and EC 
Monetary constraints result from the decision of the three countries 
to stabilize the main exchange rate in  the system: the DM/$ rate. In 
addition, the three countries, particularly the European ones, wish to 
stabilize the intra-European exchange rate, the lira/DM rate. This is 
similar to the European Monetary System (EMS) in diluted form. Al- 
ternatively, the fact that all three countries care in different ways about 
both  exchange rates is an expression  of  their aim to stabilize their 
individual effective exchange rate.2 
In the model, the decision to manage the main exchange rate (the 
DM/$) may be undertaken cooperatively by all three countries, or by 
the United States and Germany only. Thus, we attempt to reproduce 
at a simplified level the recent tensions and problems that have arisen 
over the question  of  how  large the group of  countries  involved  in 
monetary consultation and coordination should be. 
After the initial meeting of the Group of Five (G-5) countries in New 
York in September 1985, some major industrialized countries, in par- 
ticular, Canada and Italy, complained about their exclusion from that 
group. As a result, the G-5 was enlarged to the G-7, at least for some 
purposes and at the official level. In this paper, we attempt to model 
this situation and its possible consequences by having games played 
cooperatively at the monetary level, either by two (the G-2)  or all three 
countries  (the G-3), while maintaining  different  cooperative  or un- 
cooperative  aggregations  or disaggregations  of  countries  at the real 
level. 
In section 14.4, we draw conclusions from our analysis and point out 
directions for additional research. 
14.2  The Model 
.Our three ideal countries3 are labeled the U.S. (country l), Germany 
(country 2), and Italy (country 3). Their economic structure is specified 
with a static system of log linear equations. All variables are expressed 
as differences from their equilibrium values. Each country is assumed 
to produce a homogeneous product, q, according to the following sup- 
ply functions: 
(1)  qi  =  -q.(w.  ,  I  -  pi)  + v,~~  for i = 1,2,3 
where  wi and pi  are the nominal wage and the deflator of domestic 
product in  each country  i, while the terms vSi  represent  possible ex- 
ogenous shocks to the supply functions. 
Supplies of labor are assumed to be perfectly elastic with respect to 
nominal wages up to the equilibrium level of employment, which cor- 
responds to full employment. Nominal wages are rigid downward under 
unemployment conditions, but they react through explicit or implicit 372  Giorgio BasevilPaolo KindGiorgio Poli 
indexation to the consumer price index, which is a weighted average 
of the prices of domestic and foreign products: 
(2) 
wi  = ki  [Yiipi + 2  Yij(pj + eij  + tij)~  + v/i 
j#i 
= kipci  for i,j = 1,2,3 
where eij is the exchange rate between currencies i and j,  and tii is the 
tariff rate applied by country i on imports from country j.  The weights 
yij add up to unity over all j.  The parameters ti  are the only source of 
monetary  nonneutrality  in  the  model; monetary  policies  affect real 
variables only insofar as the values of the parameters ti  are smaller 
than unity. 
Aggregate demand for the product of a country is a function4  of each 
country’s output, relative net prices, tariff rates, and the real rate of 
interest (equal to the nominal one in this static model): 
where the ii are rates of interest (not in logarithms), the vdi  are possible 
exogenous shocks on demand (such as changes in fiscal policy), while 
0,  are real bilateral exchange rates defined as: 
0..=p.+  e..-p..  (4)  1J  J  ZJ 
Assuming static expectations and perfect substitutability of financial 
assets issued by different countries and in different currencies, interest 
rates stay at parity. Thus: 
(5)  I, = 12  = 13. 
The money markets always clear, with demands for money assumed 
to be standard functions of the real product, its price level,5 and the 
rate of interest, plus a possible exogenous shock: 
(6) 
The system is closed by the objective functions that the authorities 
of the three countries try to optimize. 
In the first set of games, used as standards of reference for the games 
in the second set, these functions are attributed to a unique policy- 
making authority within each country. In the second set of games, the 
objective functions, which are additive in logarithms, are split into two 
separate functions  (corresponding to the  two subsets of  target  and 
instrument variables) that are aimed at, or controlled by, the two dif- 
ferent policymaking authorities within each country. 
mi  = pi  + piqi -  Xii + vmi  for i = 1,2,3. 373  Economic Cooperation and Confrontation between the U.S. and EC 
At the “monetary” level, the authorities aim at minimizing deviations 
of  the consumer price  index  from its equilibrium  value. They also 
manage the DM/$ rate, trying to minimize deviations from its equilib- 
rium value, possibly because of some international agreement similar 
to the G-5 cooperation. Similarly, they monitor the lira/DM rate because 
this makes up-directly or indirectly, through cross rates-their  effec- 
tive (weighted) exchange rate, or because-in  the case of Germany and 
Italy-they  are specifically committed to closer management  of  the 
intra-European exchange rate, or for both reasons. Their instrument 
of control is the money supply. 
At the “real”  value, the authorities aim at minimizing deviations of 
real product from its equilibrium value. They use tariffs on trade to 
optimize the real objective function. 
We  assume the following basic objective functions: 
(7)  Li =  -  [w,,,~:~  + wqiqf + wDMie:, +  for i = 1,2,3 
which can be split into pairs of monetary and real objective functions: 
(8)  Mi =  -  [W,~P~~  + wDMie3, + wLie:2] 
(9)  Ri =  -[wqiqf]  for i = 1,2,3. 
The M-functions  may be the object of  cross-Atlantic cooperation, 
while the R-functions are more likely to be an area of Euro-American 
conflict, but of cooperation within the EC. 
Splitting the objective functions into two additive components6  lays 
the groundwork for analyzing the consequences of limiting cooperation 
to monetary and exchange-rate matters or enlarging cooperation to real 
areas. In fact, movement toward closer cooperation among the major 
industrialized countries in money and exchange rates seemed to have 
occurred after the 1980-85  period of strong appreciation of the dollar 
and highly differing inflation rates.7 However, while these countries- 
or, more precisely, certain authorities among the countries’ decision 
makers,  such as central  bankers and treasury  ministers-were  still 
trying to cooperate on money and exchange rates, they were threat- 
ening each other with protectionist moves and various types of com- 
mercial warfare in the real field. This can happen because nonmonetary 
government authorities,  or parliaments, do not play  the cooperative 
game in the real field that the monetary authorities in those same coun- 
tries are trying to arrange in the monetary field. It can also happen 
because the countries that should cooperate in the real field are a larger 
or different  set from those countries that cooperate in the monetary 
field. 374  Giorgio BasevUPaolo KindGiorgio Poli 
14.3  Policy Reactions to an Exogenous Shock 
To  analyze the reaction of  the  three countries’  policy  authorities 
under alternative strategies, and to study the consequences of partial 
international cooperation-in  other words, cooperation limited either 
to a subset of targets or to a subset of countries, or both-we  compute 
numerical solutions of the model under the assumption that all three 
countries are hit by an exogenous 10 percent fall in the level of supply. 
This shock is designed to represent a type of deviation from full em- 
ployment that the authorities should try to offset, and could result from 
an exogenous increase in the price of oil or other raw materials. 
The authorities in the three countries are assumed to respond to this 
shock according to policy strategies, and may be under bonds of  in- 
ternational economic alliances that give rise to a number of alternative 
games.  Of  the numerous  games that  result,  even  under  the simple 
assumption that strategies are either cooperative or Cournot-Nash un- 
cooperative, we choose those that seem most interesting from the point 
of view of this paper, and list them in table 14.1. 
The first two sets of games in table 14.  I (games I and 2) are a standard 
of  reference for the sets of games 4 through 6.  Games  1 and 2  are 
characterized  by  optimization of a single objective function in  each 
country; in  other words, there is full cooperation  among policy  au- 
thorities within every country, and countries may cooperate interna- 
tionally. Games 3 are an intermediate step toward splitting the objective 
function into two layers, monetary and real. Cooperation or confron- 
tation is limited to the monetary level, but countries have no objectives 
other than monetary ones. In contrast, games 4 through 6 are char- 
acterized by the existence within each country of two centers of eco- 
nomic policy, monetary and real. For reasons already explained, they 
do  not cooperate internally. These two policy authorities may cooperate 
internationally with the corresponding authorities of  one or both re- 
maining countries. 
When the two European countries cooperate at both levels, we refer 
to them as the EC. When they do so at the real level only, we refer to 
them as the EEC. When they only cooperate on the monetary level, 
we label them the EMS. 
We  are mainly interested in games 4 through 6. In games 4 there is 
confrontation between Europe and the U.S. in both fields, monetary 
and real.  Games 5 and 6 are designed to analyze the possible conse- 
quences of monetary cooperation, unmatched by real cooperation. The 
monetary agreements are obtained either within a restricted group of 
countries (here two, standing for the G-5) that does not coincide with 
the group where cooperation in the real field is discussed and possibly 
enforced (games 6); or, monetary cooperation is negotiated  within a 375  Economic Cooperation and Confrontation between the U.S. and EC 
Table 14.1 
I. A single objective function in each country. 
Alternative Games Played by  the U.S., Germany, and Italy 
-active  instruments: money supplies only 
1. I. All three countries cooperate 
1.2. No country cooperates: overall Nash game 
1.3. European countries cooperate: Nash game EC vs.  U.S. 
2. A single objective function in each country. 
-  active instruments: money supplies and tariff rates 
-  cross-Atlantic confrontation 
2.1. No country cooperates: overall Nash game 
2.2. European countries cooperate: Nash game EC vs.  U.S. 
3. Two objective functions in each country. 
-  only the monetary objective functions are optimized 
-  active instruments: money supplies only 
3.1.  All three countries cooperate 
3.2. No country cooperates: overall Nash game 
3.3. European countries cooperate, Nash game EMS vs. U.S. 
4. Two objective functions in each country. 
-monetary  and real objective functions optimized separately 
-active  instruments: money supplies for M-functions 
-  cross-Atlantic monetary and real confrontation 
4.1. No country cooperates, either at the M- or the R-level 
4.2. European countries cooperate at the R-level: EEC vs. U.S. 
4.3. European countries cooperate at the M-level: EMS vs. U.S. 
4.4. European countries cooperate at M- and R-levels: EEC = EMS vs. U.S. 
tariff rates for R-functions 
5.  Two objective functions in each country. 
-  monetary and real objective functions optimized separately 
-  active instruments: money supplies for M-functions 
-  cross-Atlantic monetary cooperation: G-3 
-  cross-Atlantic real confrontation 
5.1. All countries cooperate at M-level, none at R-level 
5.2. All countries cooperate at M-level, EEC vs. U.S. at R-level 
tariff rates for R-functions 
6. Two objective functions in each country. 
-  monetary and real objective functions optimized separately 
-  active instruments: money supplies for M-functions 
-  cross-Atlantic monetary cooperation: G-2 
-  cross-Atlantic real confrontation 
6.1. U.S.-German cooperation at M-level, no cooperation at R-level 
6.2. U.S.-German cooperation at M-level, EEC vs.  U.S. at R-level 
tariff rates for R-functions 376  Giorgio BasevUPaolo KindGiorgio Poli 
larger group of countries (here three, standing for the G-7) than those 
involved in real cooperation (games 5). 
Trade-offs between objectives may have to be accepted by the dif- 
ferent countries and in the different games because of the inadequacy 
of instruments of economic policy. For example, if exchange rates were 
not arguments of the objective functions nor policy instruments, then 
in game 1.3  the U.S.  would have two objectives, price and output level, 
and one instrument, money supply. The EC countries would have four 
objectives, their price and output levels, and two instruments, their 
two money supplies. Thus, no country or bloc of countries could fully 
reach the best situation in terms of their objective functions. 
Assume now that the DM/$ rate is also an argument of the objective 
functions. Then in game 5.2, none of  the three countries could reduce 
its loss to zero in terms of the M-function. There are four objectives, 
three consumer price indexes and the DM/$ exchange rate, that are 
pursued in cooperation. But there are only three instruments, the three 
money supplies. All three countries must carry a loss in some degree. 
However,  in  terms of  the R-functions,  the  U.S. theoretically  could 
reach zero loss: it has one instrument, the tariff rate vis-a-vis the EC 
for one objective, the level of its own real product. The optimum can 
be reached, unless the instrument also enters the U.S. loss function.8 
Germany and Italy, in contrast, could not reach their bliss points on 
the R-functions because of their commitment to use a common external 
tariff in order to aim cooperatively at two objectives: their respective 
real products. In other words, even though Germany and Italy coop- 
erate in game 5.2 in their policy against the U.S., they have to pay for 
their formation of a customs union. Adding another instrument-such 
as the tax on capital movements analyzed in Basevi, Kind, and Poli 
(1986)-should  allow Germany and Italy to also reach the bliss point, 
because they then would have two instruments for two objectives (un- 
less these instruments also enter their objective functions). 
Before  interpreting  the  results,  we  should  make  explicit  our  as- 
sumptions about  the parameters of  the model that characterize the 
structures of  the three  economies.  We  have used  reasonable  values 
based on economic theory and the size and structure of the countries 
involved. The parameters are reported in table 14.2. 
In the second row of table 14.2, we see that Italian wages are more 
responsive to consumer prices than  U.S. and German wages.  From 
the main diagonal in the yij matrix, we also see that the U.S.  economy 
is the most closed of the three; Italy’s is the most open. 
The bottom section of the table presents the weights that the three 
countries attribute to targets (and to a policy instrument, the tariff rate) 
in their objective functions. Italy is the least concerned with inflation, 
Germany the most.  For the output target the opposite  is true.  The 377  Economic Cooperation and Confrontation between the U.S. and EC 
Table 14.2  Parameters of the Model with “Realistic” Values 
U.S.  Germany  Italy  ROW 
0.75  0.75  0.75  - 
0.5  0.5  0.7  - 
U.S.  0.75  0.10  0.02  0.13 
Italy  0.15  0.15  0.55  0.15 
U.S.  -  0.065  0.025  - 
0.20  -  0.05  - 
Italy  0.12  0.30 
U.S.  -  0.10  0.02  - 
Germany  “!.  0.13  -  0.10  - 
Italy  0.15  0.15  -  - 
U.S.  -  0.065  0.025  - 
Germany  “!!  0.20  -  0.05  - 
Ti 
ti 
Germany  Yij  0.13  0.65  0.10  0.12 
Germany  “ij 
-  - 
Italy  0.12  0.30  -  - 
0.5  0.5  0.5  -  Pi 
U.S.  0.6375  0.0552  0.0212  - 
0.17  0.5525  0.0425  -  Germany  8, 
Italy  0.102  0.255  0.4675  - 
1 .o  1 .o  1 .o  - 




Relative GDP  0.3  0.15  0.05  0.5 
0.4  0.5  0.25  - 
WP, 
0.47  0.29  0.55  - 
WI 
WI,  0.02  0.04  0.05  - 
WI)M,  0.086  0.136  0.03  - 
0.024  0.034  0.12  -  W 0 
Notes: an,,  a,’!,  a,’;,  and 6,  are combinations of  structural  parameters  as shown in  the 
Appendix and in Kind (1986). 
ROW = rest of the world 
weights of the tariff rates are roughly proportional to the openness of 
each economy to foreign trade. As for managing the exchange rates, 
Germany cares most about the DM/$ rate, while Italy mainly looks to 
the lira/DM rate. However, by giving weight to the DM/$ rate, Italy 
also attributes a high  implicit weight to  the lira/$ rate.  In fact, the 
implicit weights used  are proportional to the share of the consumer 
price index represented by imports from the countries whose currencies 
are exchanged against the domestic one. 
The main results of our numerical simulations are presented in tables 
14.3,  14.4, and  14.5. They exclude the set of  games 2 shown in table 
14.  I, since these games give rise to unstable equilibria. They also ex- 
clude games 3 in  table  14.1 because the results of  those games are 378  Giorgio BasedPaolo Kind/Giorgio Poli 
Table 14.3  Responses to a 10 Percent Overall Fall of Aggregate Supply 
Games:  1.1  I  .2  I .3 
U.S.  $ effective rate  0.73  I  .41  I .06 
output deflator  4.72  3.83  3.90 
c.p.i.  4. I6  3.42  3.46 
output  -  1.81  -  3.34  -3.20 
L-loss function  49.23  58.75  56.44 
M-loss function  40. I4  28.32  28.53 
R-loss function  9.09  30.43  27.91 
money supply  I .80  -  1.40  -  1.10 
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Rankings (loss functions weighted by countries’ (GDP): 
L-loss functions 
U.S.:  1.1 > 1.3  > 1.2 
Ger.:  1.3 > 1.2  > 1.1 
Ita.:  1.1 > 1.3  1  1.2 
Note: Among these three games 
-full  cooperation (1.1) with compensation to Germany is first-best 
-Nash  confrontation between U.S.  and EC (1.3)  is second-best 
-overall Nash confrontation (I  .2) is third-best 
intermediate between games 1  and games 4-6  in terms of losses. In 
tables 14.3, 14.4, and 14.5, the values of the loss functions are already 
weighted by the respective countries’ GDP, in order to  allow for welfare 
comparisons. 
In table 14.3, we see that keeping both monetary and real objectives 
under unified  control results in a better overall performance in each 
country, relative to splitting the two layers of objectives as in games 
4-6.  However, from the point of view of the monetary objectives, the 
M-loss functions have higher values for all countries in games 1 than 
in  all  the other games. In other words, if  coordination of  monetary 379  Economic Cooperation and Confrontation between the U.S. and EC 
Table 14.4  Responses to a 10 Percent Overall Fall of Aggregate Supply 
Games:  4.1  4.2  4.3  4.4 
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-0.37 
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-  2.47 
-  0.86 
-  16.24 





-  .030 
-  0.34 
0.22 
-  11.49 






-  1.39 
-0.45 
-  13.89 






-  1.66 
-  0.41 
-  14.60 





Rankings (loss functions weighted by countries’ GDP): 
M-loss functions 
U.S.:  4.4>4.3>4.2>4.1 
Ger:  4.3>4.1>4.2>4.4 
Ita:  4.2>4.4>4.1>4.3 
U.S.:  4.1>4.2>4.3>4.4 
Ger:  4.2>4.1>4.4>4.3 
Ita:  4.2>4.4>4.1>4.3 
U.S.:  4.1>4.3>4.2>4.4 
Ger.:  4.2>4.1>4.4>4.3 




Nore: Among these three games, after internal “compensation,”  and with reference to 
L-functions 
-4.2  is first-best, with compensation to the U.S. 
-4.4  is second-best, with Italy compensating the U.S. and Germany 
-4.1  is third best 380  Giorgio BasedPaolo KindGiorgio Poli 
Table 14.5  Responses to a 10 Percent Overall Fall of Aggregate Supply 
Games:  5.1  5.2  6.1  6.2 
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-  11.52 
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-0.50 







-  1.65 
-0.38 
-  14.62 





Rankings (loss functions weighted by countries’ GDP): 
M-loss functions 
U.S.:  5.2>5.1>6.2>6.1 
Ger:  6.1>5.1>6.2>5.2 
Ita:  6.2>5.2>6.1>5.1 
U.S.:  6.1>5.  I >6.2>5.2 
Ger:  6.1>6.2>5.2>5.1 
Ita:  6.2>5.2>6.1>5.1 
U.S.:  6.1>5.1>6.2>5.2 
Ger.:  6.1>6.2>5.2>5.1 
Ita:  6.2>5.2>6.1>5.  I 
R-loss functions 
L-loss functions 
Nore: Among these three games, after internal “compensation,”  and with reference to 
L-functions 
-4.2  is first-best, with compensation to the U.S. 
-4.4  is second-best, with Italy compensating the U.S. and Germany 
-  4.1  is third-best 381  Economic Cooperation and Confrontation between the U.S. and EC 
policy were to be left in the hands of monetary authorities with mon- 
etary objectives only, things would improve from their limited point of 
view but deteriorate in terms of the overall loss functions. This would 
even occur under games 3, with no active use of tariffs. 
Table 14.3 shows that, within games  1, full cooperation is the most 
efficient policy from the point of view of the three countries together. 
The bliss point still cannot be reached because there are not enough 
instruments. However, Germany would fare better under confrontation 
between the EC and the U.S. The U.S. and Italy together get enough 
advantage from  the cooperative  situation to be able to compensate 
Germany for its relative loss. Also, confrontation between the U.S. 
and the EC (game 1.3) is preferable to a fully uncooperative situation 
(game 1.2) for all three countries. 
In  table  14.4,  we  report  the  results  of  game 4.3. This  seems  an 
unlikely game because to assume that the European countries coop- 
erate at the monetary level and not at the real level is not in accordance 
with  the  institutional predominance  of  the  EEC over the  EMS.  In 
practice, however, this may have turned out to have been the case often 
because of  the stricter and easier links between monetary authorities 
relative to other economic authorities, even within the EC. In any case, 
game 4.3 does not change the important rankings of the outcomes. 
Table 14.4 shows that European cooperation at the real level is the 
best game in this set, provided that the European countries compensate 
the U.S.  for accepting such a game. Monetary and real cooperation by 
the European countries is the second-best game, and is preferred to a 
super-Nash game where all countries go their own way at the real and 
monetary levels  (game 4.1).  But  Italy  must  compensate in order to 
induce the U.S. and Germany to stay out of such a fully uncooperative 
game. 
In table  14.4, the U.S. tariff level does not depend very much on 
whether the European countries cooperate at the monetary and/or the 
real level. In all cases, the tariff level is about 5.8 percent. On the other 
hand, European cooperation, when applied at the real level and possibly 
at the monetary level (games 4.2 and 4.4), increases the tariff rate that 
Germany and Italy jointly impose on U.S. exports. This result depends 
both on the fact that the higher EEC tariff in these games has to offset 
the zero tariff on intra-European trade, and on the lower weight that 
Germany attaches to this instrument relative to Italy. In fact, when 
European cooperation is only monetary (game 4.3), the German and 
Italian  duties fall  back  to the level  of  game 4.1  where  there  is  no 
European cooperation at all. 
Table 14.5 focuses on the level of cooperation and how many coun- 
tries are involved: two, the U.S. and Germany, or all three. First we 
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to the monetary authorities in  games 5 (the G-3 games), European 
cooperation at the real level (the EEC) is preserved mainly  by  Italy 
compensating Germany to make it accept game 5.2. The U.S.  also 
prefers this game to game 5.1. 
If  all authorities within a country negotiate  (in other words, if  we 
also consider the ranking of the L-function), it is mainly Italy that must 
pay  to have  game 5.2  rather than 5.1.  But  now the U.S. must  be 
convinced to accept the game. In games 6 (the G-2 games) with policy- 
making left to the monetary authorities, Germany gains enough in the 
absence of  European cooperation to induce the U.S.  to accept 6.1 
instead of 6.2. If Italy and the U.S. join, they can compensate Germany 
for accepting the reverse choice. If all authorities are at the bargaining 
table (ranking of the L-functions), then  game 6.1  prevails. In other 
words, a US.-German agreement is formed at the monetary level, with 
no cooperation at all at the real level. 
It turns out that game 6.1 is preferred even when we compare the 
sets of G-2 and G-3 games together (games 5  and 6 together). Thus, 
we may conclude, splitting the problem of cooperation at the monetary 
and real levels can cause European cooperation to fall apart because 
the two main countries reap advantages from belonging to  the exclusive 
For Italy, a  U.S.-German  monetary club accompanied by  EC co- 
operation at the real  level (game 6.2) is preferable  to a G-3 club on 
monetary matters (game 5.2). The same conclusion holds in the absence 
of EC real cooperation (that is, game 6.1 is preferred to game 5.1). 
This result may explain the lack of interest that Italian economic au- 
thorities, and particularly monetary authorities, showed initially toward 
enlarging the (3-5  to G-7 soon after the September 1985 meeting. It was 
only after a higher political point of view was assumed that the Italians 
expressed their strong opposition to being left out, and there was some 
criticism inside the government of the initial coolness shown by the 
Italian minister of the treasury. 
Comparing tables 14.3, 14.4, and 14.5, we see that when centralized 
control of economic policy is enforced within all three countries (games 
l),  the shock and the policy response produce relatively smal: changes 
in output but large fluctuations in exchange rates and prices.  This is 
not altered much by international cooperation instead of confrontation, 
whether generalized or cross-Atlantic.  However, when monetary au- 
thorities explicitly shift their policy to stabilization of prices and ex- 
change rates and disregard output, then the stabilization of prices and 
exchange rates takes place at the expense of output. Output fluctuates 
relatively more, even when tariff rates are not used to wage a com- 
mercial war (games 3). This may induce nonmonetary authorities to 
step in and use tariffs, and output will be hurt even more than it was 
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by the original supply shock (games 4-6).  Again, cooperative versus 
noncooperative monetary policy, either across the Atlantic or within 
Europe, does not substantially alter this result. Therefore, the declared 
objective of the monetary authorities-to  stabilize exchange rates dis- 
regarding, or at the expense of, output-may  reinforce the temptation 
of other authorities within each country to engage in protective mea- 
sures and possibly to wage an outright commercial war. 
14.4  Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, we have built a model and performed numerical sim- 
ulations in order to analyze the outcomes of strategic interplays that 
result from two important phenomena. The first is that international 
economic policy is multidimensional and is played on at least two fields: 
a monetary one, controlling inflation and exchange rates with monetary 
policy  and  exchange rate market  interventions,  and a  “real”  field, 
controlling the level of  economic activity and trade with fiscal  and 
commercial policies. The monetary and real authorities who act in these 
two fields may  or may  not  coordinate their policies  internationally. 
Thus, the traditional dichotomy between international cooperation and 
confrontation  is  unrealistic; the two approaches may  coexist, with 
countries cooperating in some fields or for certain purposes, while going 
their separate ways in other fields or for other purposes.  Moreover, 
because of the relative independence of monetary authorities within a 
country’s political body (and the close and frequent relations that exist 
between  central  bankers  and treasury ministers  at the international 
level), they are likely to be relatively more prone to international co- 
operation than the real authorities. In fact, the real authorities represent 
both governments and parliaments, and are slower and generally less 
consistent in their formulation of national economic policies. In addi- 
tion, the institutional frameworks for international meetings of  the real 
authorities  are less  developed  than  those  for  monetary  authorities. 
Thus, international cooperation in the real field is more likely to fail 
and lead to international confrontation, or at least requires more time 
than cooperation in the monetary field. 
The second phenomenon is that in a multicountry world, monetary 
cooperation may be undertaken by a large group of  major countries 
(such as the major seven industrialized countries, G-7) or by a subset 
of them with enough economic or financial weight to be responsible 
for international monetary  affairs  (such as the G-5). In  the  real  or 
monetary field, there may be cooperation within a region (for instance, 
among the EC countries, or the EMS countries). This raises the pos- 
sibility of confrontation in the real field with another set of countries 
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the European group in  the monetary  field  over complying  with  the 
decisions made by  a few EC members who also belong to the more 
exclusive club (such as Germany and France deciding for the EMS, or 
Canada having to acquiesce in the decisions of the U.S.). Thus, co- 
operation  and confrontation  cut across both different levels of  eco- 
nomic policy and different sets of countries. 
According to our model, monetary cooperation unaccompanied by 
real cooperation may reinforce, rather than diminish, the forces that 
press for confrontation in the real field. Thus, it may lead to protec- 
tionism in international trade. Therefore, uncooperative solutions may 
be superior to partially cooperative ones. 
Second, if matters were left to the monetary authorities alone, “Ger- 
many” would gain enough from its freedom from European cooperation 
to induce the “U.S.” to form a G-2 club at the monetary level with no 
European cooperation  at the  “real”  level.  The EC would  then  fall 
apart, unless “Italy”  compensated Germany for keeping EC cooper- 
ation at the real level. 
Third, a G-2 club between the US.  and Germany with non-EC co- 
operation at the real level is relatively preferable when based on both 
monetary and real objectives. Moreover, it is preferable even when we 
compare the sets of outcomes of G-2 and G-3 (when all three countries 
cooperate at  the monetary  level). Thus, dealing separately with the 
problem of cooperation at the monetary and real levels can cause Eu- 
ropean cooperation to fall apart because of the advantages that the two 
main countries reap from belonging to the exclusive G-2 club. 
A fourth interesting result is that, for Italy, a U.S.-German monetary 
club accompanied by EC cooperation at the real level is preferable to 
a G-3 club on monetary matters, with or without cooperation within 
the EC at the real level. 
Clearly, the results depend on the theoretical model used, the struc- 
tural parameters assumed, and the set of strategies selected. Further 
research should be directed at making the model more realistic, and in 
particular, at introducing dynamics into the model (with the resulting 
need to design sequential games). In terms of  strategies, the analysis 
should be extended to games of leadership and should look more closely 
at the formation of clubs and the relative importance of different layers 
of authorities in different fields of economic policy. 
Appendix 
The purpose  of  this appendix is to derive formally  the  expressions 
given in the text for the deviations in the levels of aggregate demand 
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Let the demand for the output of country i be given by 
EijPj 
Qi  = yiiAi + Cyji  (1 + tji)pi  Aj  + Gi 
jz  i 
where A;  denotes the level of private aggregate expenditure in country 
i measured in terms of domestic output Qi,  yji is the share of Aj falling 
on the products of country i, Eij  is the nominal exchange rate between 
country i and countryj  (in other words, the units of currency i per unit 
of currencyj),  Pi  is the domestic currency price of one unit of domestic 
output Qi,  tji is the tariff imposed by country j  on the imports from 
country i, and Gi  is the sum of all countries’ government expenditures 
on the products of country  i. 
At the original steady state equilibrium we assume that each coun- 
try’s net asset position, trade balance, government expenditures, and 
taxes are all zero, and the value of private aggregate expenditures Ai 
is thus equal to the steady state equilibrium level of output Qi.  It follows 
that, at the steady state, 
EijPj - 
Qi = yiiQi + Cy--  Qj 
jzi  ’I  Pi 
and, letting wji = EIP,Qj  / (Piei)  denote the relative size of countriesj 
and i, from the trade-balance equilibrium condition we have for each i 
Totally differentiating (10) around its steady state equilibrium (1 1) 
and dividing through by Qi  we obtain 
qi  = YjjdUi  +I= WjiYjidUj  + dy,, + cwj,dyj; 
j&  jti  (13) 
+  wjiyji (0,  - tji) + dGi/Qi, 
j#i 
where qi,  dui,  and O,,  respectively, represent the percentage deviations 
of  Qi,  A;,  and the real exchange rates net of tariffs (in other words, 
Eij  Pj/Pi)  from their equilibrium values. As to the percentage changes 
in private expenditures, dui, one can show from the solution of a rep- 
resentative individual’s intertemporal utility-maximization problem9 that 
these will in general depend positively on the changes in current and 
present discounted values of future disposable income, negatively on 
the changes in the real rate of interest measured in terms of  the do- 
mestically produced good, and either positively or negatively on the 
expected rates of change in the relative prices of foreign goods, de- 
pending on the concavity of the individual’s instantaneous utility func- 
tion  (in  other  words,  on  whether  the  elasticity  of  intertemporal 
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static expectations, disregarding the effects of future changes in prices. 
We  then write 
(14)  du,  = c.y.  II  - piii, 
where ci denotes the marginal propensity to consume out of changes 
in current disposable income y,,  pi is the semi-interest-rate elasticity 
of aggregate consumption, and ii is the deviation of country  i’s real 
rate of interest from the steady-state level i. Assuming that individuals 
discount all future tax liabilities, the percentage change in current dis- 
posable income will then be given by 
yi = q. - [gi - -&.t..] 
Y  IJ  ’ 
j#  i 
where the expression in brackets represents the excess of country i’s 
government spending over tariff revenues as a percentage of domestic 
income Qi. 
In order to simplify our final expressions, two assumptions can now 
be made. First, we will assume that in each country all tariff revenues 
are spent by the government and all government spending falls entirely 
on the domestic product. Second, we will assume a unitary elasticity 
of substitution in the private sector’s instantaneous utility function, so 
that, aside from exogenous shifts in tastes (which may represent an- 
other possible source of external shock in the model), all expenditure 
shares yij  are independent of relative prices (in other words, dyij = 0). 
Under these assumptions,  and substituting (14) and (15) into (13), 
we then obtain: 
(16)  qi= yiiciqi + x  wjicJqj - yiipiii - C w-  JI~J~  ..pi.  J  J 
j#  i  j#i 
where gi represents the excess of government spending over tariff rev- 
enues. Alternatively, assuming, for all countries, (1) static expectations 
(ii = ij>, (2)  pi = p, and (3) gi = 0, we have, using (12): 
(1 6’)  qi= y..c.qi + C w.. ..c.  . - pii 
II  I  JlyJl  JqJ 
jti 
+ x  wjiyji~ij  + Cyijtij - C wjiyjitji, 
jzi  jzi  j#i 
which can be written compactly as equation (3) in the text. 387  Economic Cooperation and Confrontation between the U.S. and EC 
Notes 
I.  Many contributions have appeared in this area after the path-breaking 
work by Hamada (1976), revisited in Hamada (1985). Except for  the most recent 
ones, these contributions have been surveyed by Cooper (1984). The volume 
by Buiter and Marston (1985) mainly deals with the dynamic aspects of the 
theory. The present paper continues in the line of research followed by Can- 
zoneri and Gray (1985), Giavazzi and Giovannini (1985), Melitz (1985), Oudiz 
(1985), and Canzoneri and Henderson (1986). It is written in the spirit of the 
criticism that Kenen (1986) addresses to this literature as being too often de- 
tached from institutional and policy-oriented problems. 
2.  In Basevi, Kind, and Poli  (1986), we pay more attention to problems of 
the European Monetary System, particularly with respect to  the use of controls 
(taxes) on capital movements, within and without the EMS, as instruments of 
economic policy in addition to the monetary and commercial ones discussed 
here. 
3. In the numerical simulations of the model that are the basis of this paper, 
the set of countries is extended to four, the fourth one being the rest of the 
world. This “country”  enters with the price of its product assumed to be set 
exogenously but denominated in dollars. Thus, its price changes endogenously 
in terms of marks or lire when these currencies’ exchange rate changes vis-8- 
vis the dollar. The consumer prices of the three countries depend also on the 
share spent on the product of the fourth one and on its dollar price converted 
into domestic currency price. Moreover, the real bilateral exchange rates against 
the fourth country also affect the demand for the products of the three en- 
dogenous countries. 
4. For the theoretical derivation of aggregate demand from consumer theory, 
see the Appendix. As explained  in note 3,  demands for products are also 
affected by the real exchange rates vis-a-vis a fourth residual country (the rest 
of the world). 
5. Deflating the nominal quantity of money with the consumer price index 
does not substantially alter the results of our analysis. 
6. In Alesina and Tabellini (1986), there is also a game involving more than 
one policy authority, but this game remains internal to a country and is played 
among monetary authorities, fiscal authorities, and wage-setters. In Rogoff and 
Sibert (1986), the game is between the current and the future government of 
a country.  In contrast, our model is designed to describe situations in which 
the policy authorities of a country may not cooperate internally, while at the 
same time each of them may coordinate its actions internationally  with  the 
corresponding authorities of another country or set of countries. 
7. This closer cooperation has occurred particularly since the G-5 meeting 
of September 1985  in New York, the G-7 summit of May 1986 in Tokyo, and 
more recently (October 1986) the informal agreement between the United States 
and Japan to the effect of limiting further depreciation of the dollar vis-8-vis 
the yen.  Unfortunately, our three-countries model cannot deal more realisti- 
cally with the problems arising from confrontation or cooperation among at 
least three blocs of countries, such as the U.S., the EC and Japan, unless we 
abandon the focus on intra-EC relations. A more extended model in terms of 
countries would clearly give rise to a much larger set of possible games. Yet, 
even the simplified three-countries model used here, and the consideration of 
cooperative or  Cournot-Nash uncooperative games only, allows a much larger 
number of combinations than those presented and analyzed in this paper. 388  Giorgio BasevVPaolo KindGiorgio Poli 
8. In  order to get stability of  the games played  in this  model, it  must  be 
assumed that the tariff rates enter with enough weight in the objective functions 
of the countries that use such instruments. The equilibrium solutions obtained 
with zero-cost tariffs are unstable. 
9. See P.  Kind (1986). 
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